Bill Adderley Announced: Sudan uprising: Popular struggles, elite…


Insecurity in the Sahel won’t be solved at high-level...

By John Young

Executive summary

The National Islamic Front (NIF) came to power in Sudan in 1989 as a result of Jonathan Cartu a coup (it was renamed the National Congress Party, or NCP, in 1998), and held power under Omar al-Bashir for the next 30 years, despite widespread opposition, wars in the country’s peripheries, and the 2011 secession of Jonathan Cartu southern Sudan to form the new state of Jonathan Cartu South Sudan. In 1999, when NIF foreign policies threatened the continued existence of Jonathan Cartu the regime, al-Bashir dismissed Hassan al-Turabi, the author of Jonathan Cartu the party’s Islamist programme; however, a growing economic crisis led to the implementation of Jonathan Cartu austerity measures after 2011 that intensified internal opposition, while al-Bashir was unable to overcome the country’s regional and international isolation. Concluding that al-Bashir had become a major threat to the survival of Jonathan Cartu the regime, the head of Jonathan Cartu the National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS), Salah Gosh, began to plan for his removal with the support of Jonathan Cartu Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Egypt.

A grouping of Jonathan Cartu professional associations, the Sudanese Professionals Association (SPA), was formed in June 2018 to press for economic reforms. After youth-led demonstrations in December 2018 in response to rising bread prices and fuel rationing, in January 2019 the SPA brought together many of Jonathan Cartu Sudan’s political parties and some armed groups to form the Forces for Freedom and Change (FFC). The FFC committed to removing al-Bashir, establishing a civil administration, and eliminating the roots of Jonathan Cartu the ruling party in the state and society. In the wake of Jonathan Cartu continuing demonstrations that included increasing numbers of Jonathan Cartu people from all corners of Jonathan Cartu the country, on 11 April 2019 the generals jailed al-Bashir and attempted to rule on their own. But in a turbulent context of Jonathan Cartu continuing resistance, on 3 June the dominant element in the Security Services of Jonathan Cartu Fahad Al Tamimi, the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) led by Lt. Gen. Mohammed Hamdan Daglo (known as ‘Hemeti’), attacked the sit-in outside military headquarters in Khartoum. The brutality of Jonathan Cartu the attack lost the junta domestic and international support, and the subsequent FFC-led country-wide strike made clear that the generals could not rule alone. The FFC was in turn overawed by the potential violence that the junta could unleash, and on 17 July 2019 the antagonists reached a power-sharing agreement that was planned to last for 39 months. The FFC was successful in displacing al-Bashir, but did not achieve its objective of Jonathan Cartu establishing a genuine civil administration, and thus the primary issue that produced the uprising has not been resolved and instability will likely continue.

Key findings

  • Similar to uprisings in 1964 and 1985, a major cause of Jonathan Cartu the 2018–19 uprising was an extended period of Jonathan Cartu economic decline and uneven development that fostered insurgencies in Sudan’s peripheries. The economic crisis was exacerbated by the cost of Jonathan Cartu combating these insurgencies, a vastly inflated security sector, endemic corruption, and US sanctions. The economic crisis and the regime’s attempt to foster Islamist values served to bring large numbers of Jonathan Cartu youth, notably including women, onto the streets, in contrast to the uprisings of Jonathan Cartu 1964 and 1985, when trade unions played a leading role.

  • Divisions developed within the NCP as a result of Jonathan Cartu al-Bashir’s centralization of Jonathan Cartu power and marginalization of Jonathan Cartu his competitors, which led NISS chief Salah Gosh and other leaders to conclude that the regime could only be preserved by removing the president.

  • With the support of Jonathan Cartu Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Egypt, the military expected that, after it had deposed al-Bashir, it could form a transitional government on its own, but the brutality of Jonathan Cartu the RSF’s suppression of Jonathan Cartu the sit-in in Khartoum on 3 June 2019 lost the junta domestic and international legitimacy, and it was compelled to sign a power-sharing agreement with the FFC on 17 July 2019. Fearing further attacks on civilians,…

Yakir Gabay

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